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India’s DNA synthesis landscape: regulatory frameworks, industry structure, and biosecurity gaps
- Authors

- Name
- Vishal V
- @VishalVignesh_
Notes
bioeconomies (1)
Anything that generates economic value using biological resources, organisms, or processes.
From harvesting crops to gene therapy.
third globally in the number of in-country custom DNA synthesis providers (1)
1 Introduction
synthetic nucleic acids constitute a foundation for applications (1)
current regulatory landscape remains highly fragmented, with many laws and regulations outdated or insufficient (The World Economic Forum and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2020; Asia Centre for Health Security), where screening practices are not consistently implemented worldwide (1)
significant gaps remain in understanding the extent to which these companies implement customer and sequence screening (1)
The 2 problems.
It is one of the largest and fastest-growing bioeconomies in the world, expanding from approximately USD 10 billion in 2014 to over USD 165 billion in 2024, with projections reaching USD 300 billion by 2030 (2)
eferred to as the “pharmacy of the world,” India plays a major role in the production of vaccines and generic medicines worldwide (2)
India’s DNA synthesis industry is concentrated in key innovation hubs such as New Delhi, Bengaluru, and Hyderabad (2)
2 Policy and regulatory landscape
two existing sets of laws and regulations provide frameworks under which DNA synthesis activities and their potential misuse could be considered by relevant authorities (2)
first one is the Environment Protection Law of 1986 and the associated 1989 regulation titled ‘Rules for the manufacture, use/ import/export and storage of hazardous microorganisms/genetically engineered organisms or cells’ (2)
1st set of laws.
1.1.
several competent authorities at different levels: (2)
- Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (2)
- Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (2)
- Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBSCs) (2)
- Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (2)
- State and District level authorities (2)
production of genetically engineered products is prohibited without the approval of the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (2)
rules and the follow-up guidelines on the IBSCs in 2011 and 2020 have empowered the IBSCs to make decisions (2)
revised and simplified ‘Guidelines on Import, Export and Exchange of GE organisms and products thereof for R&D purposes’ set conditions for the IBSC and the RCGM, and approvals for trade and exchange of nucleic acids which include synthetic DNA (2)
1990, another set of rules and guidelines was implemented to establish detailed biosafety regulations in India, and was subsequently revised in 2017. These were called “Regulations and Guidelines on Biosafety of Recombinant DNA Research and Biocontainment” (2)
1.2.
None of these rules or regulations include specific provisions or requirements related to customer screening or DNA sequence screening (2)
IBSC clearance requires researchers to provide comprehensive information about all genetic experiments (2)
India’s Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) export control list, genetic elements that could enhance the pathogenicity of listed microorganisms are implicitly regulated, particularly where they pose a risk to human, animal, or plant health (2)
Department of Biotechnology (DBT), which receives contextual inputs from the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change (MoEFCC) (2)
biosecurity risks. However, these risks do find rare mention in some state-level policies, such as the Karnataka State Biotechnology Policy 2024–2029 (2)
1.3.
State level policy.
At the national level, DBT hosts the RCGM Secretariat, which is responsible for implementing several of these regulations (3)
IBSC clearances must be uploaded on IBKP to register and obtain an RCGM certificate (3)
second set of laws under which misuse of synthetic DNA could be considered includes the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act of 2005 (amended in 2022) (3)
2nd set of laws.
2.1.
provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in India and prohibits any material that could lead to the development or delivery of biological weapons. These provisions could potentially apply to synthetic DNA, although synthetic DNA is not explicitly referenced in the Act (3)
based on the misuse context, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (amended in 2019) could be applied to prevent terrorist activities involving biological weapons (3)
2.2.
Export licenses for controlled materials are required and issued by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), making the export control regime the primary—and enforceable—point of oversight (3)
3 Industry landscape
United States leads with 111 companies offering custom synthesis services, followed by China with 77. India ranks third, with 31 in-country custom nucleic acid companies (3)
India accounts for approximately 9% of the global share of custom nucleic acid companies, ranking third worldwide, based on the total number of such companies identified across 74 countries, and first within Central and Southern Asia (3)
59 companies associated with nucleic acid services were identified in India. Of these 59 companies, only 31 conduct custom in-country DNA synthesis, while 21 operate as third-party vendors (3)
India Companies:
59 total nucleic acid companies
- 31 custom DNA synthesis
- 21 third-party vendors
- 7 related services (like sequencing)
When it comes to screening practices, only a few companies have oligo order forms on their websites, which could be used to collect customer information with the possibility of conducting customer screening (3)
only the name of the gene is required (3)
Indian companies are not members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) and do not follow its protocols at the time of writing this article (3)
IGSC member companies have Indian distributors and subsidiaries (3)
combination of India’s status as a Major Synthesis Hub and its limited policy oversight represents a significant biosecurity concern flagged explicitly by the Global Synthesis Map (The International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science) research, which identifies India as a priority country for policy advocacy (3)
screening is implicit rather than mandatory (3)
4 Policy recommendations and way forward
in the absence of a national biosecurity strategy, a specific DNA synthesis screening framework, and a defined “sequences of concern” list, customer and sequence screening for biosecurity risks is not mandatory for companies based in India selling at a national level (4)
significant number of companies conduct in-house gene and oligo synthesis in India, and several more are part of the distribution networks of largely U.S.-based companies (4)
substantial effort would require close engagement with industry partners such as the Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises (ABLE), the domestic biotech industry body (4)
open-source, and globally available tools such as IBBIS’s Common Mechanism (4)
At present, DNA synthesis screening represents one of the most practical and effective safeguards available to reduce the potential misuse of synthetic DNA (4)
recent work by Microsoft researchers and collaborators, including IBBIS, demonstrated that generative protein design tools can produce substantially modified protein sequences that may evade conventional sequence-based screening approaches, prompting subsequent improvements to existing screening tools (4)
Common Mechanism has similarly continued to evolve and is designed to provide greater resilience against screening-evasion attempts, including AI-generated sequences (4)
concrete near-term steps, DBT should assume a central coordinating role, in consultation with DGFT and ICMR, and initiate the development of a national “sequences of concern” framework (4)
existing international frameworks such as the IGSC Harmonized Screening Protocol, along with a reporting mechanism for flagged orders (4)
Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and DBT should establish a certification scheme for domestic synthesis providers that adopt sequence and customer screening (4)
incentive-based, with public research funding and government procurement progressively favoring synthesis providers that demonstrate adherence to recognized customer and sequence screening practices (4)
proportion of domestic synthesis providers conducting both sequence and customer screening, participation in a national certification scheme, the number of relevant IBSCs receiving dedicated biosecurity training, and the establishment and use of mechanisms for reporting and escalating potentially concerning orders (4)
Metrics to track during transformation / Indicators.
If voluntary adoption and market incentives fail to achieve sufficient screening coverage, India should consider progressively stronger measures, including linking compliance (4)
U.S. framework leverages federal funding and procurement mechanisms to promote compliance (4)
Incentive-based.
2024 U.S. Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening established expectations for sequence-of-concern screening, customer legitimacy assessment, reporting of potentially illegitimate orders, record retention, and procurement from providers adhering to the framework (5)
Executive Order 14,292, issued in May 2025, directed the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to revise or replace both the 2024 Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening and the 2024 U.S. Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (5)
the adoption of nucleic acid synthesis screening should be understood as a continuum rather than as a binary distinction between countries that screen and those that do not (5)